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I N D E X
Of
EXHIBITS

<u>Doc.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Def.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Pros.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>For</u> <u>Ident.</u>	<u>In</u> <u>Evidence</u>
2152-A		3372	Affidavit of MURAKAMI, Keisaku		32007

1 Wednesday, 29 October 1947

2 - - -

3
4 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
5 FOR THE FAR EAST
6 Court House of the Tribunal
7 War Ministry Building
8 Tokyo, Japan

9 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
10 at 0930.

11 - - -

12 Appearances:

13 For the Tribunal, all Members sitting, with
14 the exception of: HONORABLE JUSTICE R. B. PAL, Member
15 from India, not sitting from 0930 to 1600; HONORABLE
16 JUSTICE B. V. A. ROLING, Member from the Kingdom of
17 the Netherlands, not sitting from 1330 to 1445.

18 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

19 For the Defense Section, same as before.

20 - - -

21 (English to Japanese and Japanese
22 to English interpretation was made by the
23 Language Section, IMTFE.)
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

3 THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present
4 except SHIRATORI, who is represented by counsel. We
5 have a certificate from the prison surgeon at Sugamo
6 certifying that he is ill and unable to attend the
7 trial today. The certificate will be recorded and
8 filed.

9 Major Blakeney.

10 - - -

11 K U S U O M A T S U U R A, called as a witness on
12 behalf of the prosecution, resumed the stand and
13 testified through Japanese interpreters as
14 follows:

15 CROSS-EXAMINATION

16 BY MR. BLAKENEY (Continued):

17 Q After your transfer to the Kwantung Army
18 in 1943 you testified it was quite clear that war
19 would be started against the USSR. Did you ever see
20 the Kwantung Army operations plans for, say, the
21 year 1943?

22 A I have never seen the operations plan.

23 Q Did you see the operations plan for the year
24 1944?

25 A I have not seen it.

1 Q Or 1945?

2 A I have not seen the plan itself but I heard
3 explanations regarding the outlines of the plan.

4 Q Then the aggression which was to have been
5 carried out at the time of your arrival in the
6 Kwantung Army in 1943, I suppose, was in connection
7 with the Kantokuen, was it?

8 A According to what I heard from the chief
9 of the code section at that time it was connected
10 with the Kantokuen plan.

11 Q That is Major KOBAYASHI, isn't it?

12 A Yes.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Most of this comparatively
14 junior-officer information is hearsay.

15 MR. BLAKENEY: It practically all is, of
16 course, but, hearsay being admissible here, it must
17 have some probative value.

18 THE PRESIDENT: It may have less weight than
19 other evidence and considerably less although admis-
20 sible. I am suggesting to you that lengthy cross-
21 examination of a junior officer whose information to
22 a great extent is based on hearsay is not warranted.

23 MR. BLAKENEY: I do not expect to be a very
24 great deal longer, your Honor.

25 Q So, according to your understanding of it,

1 the Kantokuen not only provided for large-scale
2 maneuvers but also constituted an operational plan
3 for operations against the USSR, did it?

4 A Yes.

5 Q Yesterday you told us something in detail
6 about various maneuvers that were carried out by the
7 Kwantung Army during your time there. You mentioned
8 particularly two: one which you said took place near
9 Chamussu for the purpose of practicing withstanding
10 cold and one at Tsitsihar, a river-crossing operations
11 maneuver.

12 Isn't it a fact that each year in the
13 Kwantung Army there was one large-scale maneuver?

14 COLONEL IVANOV: The prosecution objects to
15 this question as being repetitive and outside the
16 scope of the affidavit.

17 THE PRESIDENT: It certainly is repetitive,
18 Major Blakeney. I would not say it is outside the
19 scope of the affidavit though.

20 MR. BLAKENEY: He has never before been asked
21 about any other maneuvers than those two he mentioned.
22 In order to show that these two maneuvers mentioned
23 by him were not the special, significant things that
24 he says, I wish to extract the information that such
25 maneuvers occurred annually.

1 COLONEL IVANOV: Your Honor, I must say
2 that the Kwantung Army each year held not only one
3 maneuver but they held maneuvers in spring and in the
4 winter.

5 THE PRESIDENT: Colonel, you cannot give
6 evidence; but we have heard this from other witnesses
7 and I do not think it is contested that there were
8 annual maneuvers.

9 COLONEL IVANOV: We think that this line of
10 cross-examination is just a waste of time.

11 THE PRESIDENT: I think we are all in
12 agreement with that.

13 Q Who told you the contents of the 1945
14 operations plan?

15 A The person who gave me the explanation was
16 Lieutenant Colonel ONO, Katsuichi, who was my superior
17 officer, who was in charge of the signal service
18 section.

19 Q Was he an operations officer?

20 A He was a staff officer.

21 Q I didn't ask you that. I asked you if he
22 was an operations officer.

23 A He was staff officer in charge of signal
24 service.

25 Q Was he an operations officer?

1 A He was not an operations officer.

2 Q Was he given access to operations plans?

3 A I think, naturally, he was in that position.

4 Q Did he tell you that he had seen the plan?

5 A He didn't say that he saw it.

6 Q How did he say that he got his information?

7 A He made no explanation as to how he obtained
8 the information.

9 Q What did he tell you were the contents of
10 the 1945 operations plan?

11 A That the operations plans for 1945 was an
12 operation for the defense of the internal regions of
13 Manchuria, that the duty of the Kwantung Army was the
14 defense of Korea.

15 The contents of the operations plan was
16 that at first the units along the Soviet-Manchukuo
17 border, especially those on the east front or the
18 north front, were, while offering resistance,
19 gradually to withdraw, offering--

20 THE MONITOR: Japanese court reporter.

21 (Whereupon, the Japanese court reporter
22 read.)

23 THE INTERPRETER: "I do not think the
24 explanation I made, as transcribed by the reporter,
25 is clear," statement of the witness.

1 We shall attempt an interpretation of a
2 previous statement:

3 The contents of the operations plan was
4 that Japanese units along the Soviet-Manchukuo
5 border, especially those facing the east and northern
6 fronts, were gradually to withdraw while resisting.

7 A (Continuing) Let me repeat that at first
8 units along the border, especially those on the
9 eastern and northern fronts were, in accordance with
10 the resistance situation, to hold out -- to conduct
11 holding-out operations; also to conduct a large-
12 scale repulsive operation against the Soviet Army
13 in the area west of the railway running between
14 Changchun and Dairen which is believed to be the
15 object of the USSR's attack -- offensive actions
16 in their attack from the westward direction.

17 Q When did the Lieutenant Colonel tell you
18 about this?

19 A The end of June, 1945.

20 Q Where?

21 A In an anteroom of the staff department of
22 the Kwantung Army.

23 Q Did he tell you how he got his information?

24 COLONEL IVANOV: The prosecution objects to
25 that, your Honor, because the whole group of questions

1 connected with the plan of 1945 is outside the
2 scope of the affidavit and the examination-in-chief.

3 THE PRESIDENT: The objection is overruled.

4 Q Answer the question.

5 A He did not tell me where and how he obtained
6 such information but I believe that it is only natural
7 that he would be able to obtain such information in
8 view of the fact that he was a staff officer in the
9 first section, and being staff officer in charge of
10 communications he would naturally be in a position to
11 know.

12 Q The staff officer in charge of communications
13 would naturally have communicated to him the part of
14 the plans that concerned him, wouldn't he?

15 A The matter concerning the staff officer in
16 charge of communications, I cannot relate it to you
17 here.

18 Q Do you know what the security or secrecy
19 classification of these operational plans were?

20 A Highest military secret, of course.

21 Q That is the highest classification for
22 secrecy, isn't it?

23 A Yes.

24 Q It is a fact, isn't it, that these operations
25 plans were known to only a very few officers,

1 operations officers, primarily and were, in fact,
2 not even known to division commanders of the Kwantung
3 Army?

4 COLONEL IVANOV: The prosecution objects
5 to this question as it is being repetitive. Yester-
6 day the defense counsel asked the same question.

7 MR. BLAKENEY: Yesterday I asked him about
8 the Kantokuen.

9 THE PRESIDENT: I do not know what help we
10 can get from a comparatively junior officer on the
11 matter of the extent of secrecy--an officer who was
12 never a staff officer. However, the objection is
13 overruled, but it does seem a waste of time.

14 MR. BLAKENEY: I will be glad to withdraw
15 that question.

16 Q Was it customary in the Kwantung Army
17 headquarters for staff officers to gossip to infer-
18 iors about matters that were military secret?

19 A They were not permitted to talk of such
20 matters as gossip; but, of course, although it cannot
21 be known in all its details and ramifications and
22 extent of concreteness as the officer in charge of
23 operations, still it is possible to learn of the
24 plan of operations in so far as it related to a cer-
25 tain officer's scope of duty and nature of duty.

1 To that extent it is possible to know.

2 Lieutenant Colonel ONO told me the outlines
3 of the operations plans for the year 1945 in his
4 capacity as chief of the communications section to
5 me as chief of the code section in connection with
6 the handling of code plans.

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1 Q How do all these details that you told us
2 affect the work of a cipher clerk?

3 A May I have the question repeated? I could
4 not understand it.

5 Q What was there in your duties in connection
6 with ciphers which required this signal officer, ONO,
7 to disclose to you all the details of the 1945 opera-
8 tions plans which you have outlined here?

9 A In connection with codes, its purpose is
10 carried out only in the way it is handled. In order
11 to connect codes with operations it is most important
12 in establishing the time that they are prepared, when
13 they are handed over to the necessary units and how
14 they are used. These points are of very great import-
15 ance. And the handling of codes cannot be done ef-
16 fectively unless the outlines of the operations plan
17 were known. Especially if the handling of the matter
18 of codes is not done properly various difficulties of
19 a critical nature would occur. For instance, if a
20 unit is surrounded -- happens to become surrounded by
21 the enemy, unless that particular unit has reserve
22 codes in use, then otherwise the repetition of the
23 same codes will defeat the purposes of the codes. In
24 other words, it would amount to using the same code
25 book over again and defeating the purpose of the code.

1 And by the use of such codes by units encircled by
2 the enemy would defeat the purpose of any operations
3 by affecting the general over-all operations.

4 THE MONITOR: And that will result in an
5 entire operations -- no, delete that -- and that will
6 affect the entire operational plan.

7 Q Now, Witness, just a minute. We don't want
8 all those details. That is not answering my question.
9 I asked you why you had to be told the full outline
10 of the operations plan in connection with codes.

11 A Then let me state my conclusion.

12 Q All right.

13 A At any rate the code officer -- it was nec-
14 essary for the code officer to be acquainted with at
15 least the outline of the operations plan.

16 Q All right. Now, if that is true, why weren't
17 you told the contents of the operations plans in 1943
18 and 1944? Why was it only in 1945?

19 A In 1943 I was not in charge of the code sec-
20 tion. I was a subordinate officer in the section.

21 Q In 1944?

22 A In August 1944 I became chief of the code sec-
23 tion, and at that time, on various occasions, I asked
24 the staff officer in charge of my particular section
25 as to what the situation was. But this staff officer

1 told me that nothing had been decided yet and told
2 me nothing. That is following the month of August,
3 1944.

4 Q Told you that the operations plan had not
5 yet been decided in August of that year?

6 A Yes.

7 Q But in 1945 it was already decided in June?

8 A The Kwantung Army was in rather difficult
9 circumstances because from the month of February of
10 1944 many units, in considerable number, of the Kwan-
11 tung Army were transferred to the southern areas.

12 Q Well, do I understand there was never an
13 operations plan for 1944?

14 A I have absolutely no knowledge of that myself.

15 Q Well, how could you carry out your duties as
16 chief of the cipher section if you didn't know the
17 outlines of the operations plan?

18 COLONEL IVANOV: The witness replied that in
19 the first half of 1944 he was not the head of the
20 ciphering -- chief of the ciphering section. The prose-
21 cution objects to that question upon the ground of its
22 being repetitive.

23 MR. BLAKENEY: He said he became chief of the
24 cipher section in August of 1944. Of course, it isn't
25 repetitive. I never before asked him this point

1 designed to attack his credibility.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Some of my colleagues have the
3 view that you are really arguing with the witness,
4 Major Blakeney.

5 MR. BLAKENEY: If it is argument to ask him
6 to explain a patent contradiction, sir, perhaps I am.

7 THE PRESIDENT: If he contradicts himself
8 you may well leave the cross-examination pass. Ordina-
9 rarily, counsel getting a contradiction would stop
10 cross-examination at that point unless he wanted to
11 be very fair to the witness. If that is your purpose
12 you may insist on an answer and the question will be
13 allowed.

14 MR. BLAKENEY: I might say that that has not
15 been the practice in the jurisdictions with which I
16 am familiar and which, therefore, is the only practice
17 that I know. But I will leave that matter.

18 Q Did this Colonel ONO, the chief signal officer,
19 did he attend staff conferences of the Kwantung Army
20 relating to operations plans, operations matters?

21 A Naturally he has attended them.

22 Q Regularly?

23 A Yes.

24 Q Did the chief of the cipher section attend
25 them?

1 A No.

2 Q Never?

3 A Never.

4 Q As a matter of fact, were you ever in the
5 operations room where the operations plan was kept?

6 A No.

7 Q So that, to sum it up, all you know about
8 these operations plans is what you were told by
9 various people?

10 A Yes, exactly as you say.

11 Q Were you ever told anything about the contents
12 of the plans by the Commander in Chief of the Kwantung
13 Army, the Chief of Staff or the Vice Chief of Staff?

14 A No.

15 Q Now, your predecessor, Major KOBAYASHI, who
16 told you all about the Kantokuen plan for aggression
17 against the U.S.S.R., he didn't know any more than
18 you did what he was talking about, did he?

19 A I do not know what extent KOBAYASHI's knowl-
20 edge was.
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1 Q Well, his position and his functions and his
2 rank and his background were just the same when he was
3 Chief of the Cipher Section as yours when you were,
4 weren't they?

5 COLONEL IVANOV: The prosecution objects. The
6 question has no relevancy to the issue.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Well, I don't know what he knows
8 about KOBAYASHI's issue, but as one of his informants
9 he should be able to answer that question. Objection
10 overruled.

11 A May I have the question again?

12 Q Repeat it to him.

13 (Whereupon, the question was read by the
14 official court reporter as above recorded.)

15 A Yes, the same.

16 Q You heard a good many rumors about when this war
17 would be launched, didn't you?

18 THE PRESIDENT: None of us want him cross-
19 examined on rumors. He was only a major or something of
20 the kind, after all. He wasn't a staff officer. Most
21 of his information was given to him by others. We don't
22 want anybody cross-examined here about rumors.

23 Q Well, I will put it this way, then: You reached
24 the conclusion, didn't you, that the war against the
25 U.S.S.R. would be launched before the end of 1941?

1 COLONEL IVANOV: This question is repetitive
2 and the opinions and conclusions of this witness are of
3 no interest to the Court.

4 THE PRESIDENT: We have no interest in his
5 conclusions of that nature. The most valuable period
6 of his service, as far as his evidence goes, is that
7 when he was a cipher clerk and tens of thousands of girls
8 throughout the Allied countries were cipher clerks and
9 we wouldn't waste all this time on their evidence.

10 MR. BLAKENEY: Of course, the prosecution, who
11 now object to his opinions, put them in evidence in his
12 affidavit over repeated objection from the defense. But
13 we will leave that.

14 Q At any rate, when you were in the Kwantung Army
15 you think there was a plan for the commencement of
16 aggression against the Soviet Union about the beginning
17 of winter of 1943, wasn't there?

18 A Yes.

19 Q And you got that information from one lieutenant
20 colonel -- we are getting into the high ranks now --
21 Lieutenant Colonel TOMURA, Morio, who told you all about
22 the directives of the Imperial Headquarters on that
23 matter?
24

25 COLONEL IVANOV: This question is being asked
for the third time. The prosecution objects.

1 THE PRESIDENT: I think we are all satisfied
2 we have heard enough on that point.

3 MR. BLAKENEY: I should like to point out that
4 this informant and this information have never before
5 been touched on cross-examination. He now purports to
6 quote the Imperial Headquarters directives.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Well, ask him.

8 Q That is right, isn't it?

9 A Yes.

10 Q But even this lieutenant colonel did not under-
11 take to tell you when the operations would start, did
12 he?

13 A No, he didn't say anything.

14 Q By the way, did he explain to you how it came
15 about that a lieutenant colonel, who was a liaison
16 officer with the Kwantung Army, knew the directives of
17 the Imperial General Headquarters?

18 A No.

19 Q By the way, what was the condition of the
20 strength of the Kwantung Army at the beginning of the
21 winter of 1943 as compared with, say, a year earlier?

22 A On the whole about the same.

23 Q You mean to say that at the end of 1943 the
24 strength of the Kwantung Army was, on the whole, about
25 the same as a year earlier?

1 A Yes, that is what I mean.

2 Q Had any divisions been withdrawn?

3 A Not at the end of 1943.

4 Q Any tanks been withdrawn?

5 A Not at that time.

6 Q Aircraft?

7 A With regard to aircraft I have very little if no
8 knowledge.

9 Q What was the approximate strength of the Kwantung
10 Army at the beginning of the winter of 1943?

11 A Approximately twenty divisions, two tank divisions,
12 one tank brigade. In addition there was an airforce.

13 Q Total man power?

14 A I have no recollection.

15 Q Where did you get those figures? Did they
16 come to you officially in the course of your business?

17 A Yes, officially in line of duty.

18 Q Now, the attack which you have got planned for
19 the winter of 1943 was to be a surprise attack. What
20 does that mean?

21 THE PRESIDENT: I have heard the expression
22 thousands of times and it has never occurred to me to
23 ask anybody what it meant.

24 MR. BLAKENEY: It seems to be used here as a
25 term of some obloquy.

MATSUURA

CROSS

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1 THE PRESIDENT: Well, we don't want him to
2 answer it. Apparently he doesn't want to answer it
3 himself.
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1 Q What was the approximate strength of the
2 Soviet forces in the Far East at the beginning of the
3 winter of 1943?

4 COLONEL IVANOV: This is repetitive and
5 outside of the scope of his affidavit.

6 MR. BLAKENEY: It has never been mentioned
7 before, and if you will look on page 6 of the affi-
8 davit, end of paragraph 4, you will find some com-
9 parison of the strength of the two armies.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Objection overruled.

11 A I, myself, have no sufficient knowledge as
12 to the strength of the Soviet forces at that time.

13 Q Witness, you know very well, don't you, that
14 the decision to wage war is one that is not made by
15 captains and majors and cryptographic clerks? It is
16 not made by the Kwantung Army; it is not made even by
17 the Imperial General Headquarters; but it is made as
18 a matter of national policy on a much higher plain.

19 COLONEL IVANOV: The Court repeatedly drew
20 attention of the parties not to make long preliminary
21 statements to the questions. Besides, this question
22 is of no purpose in connection with this witness.

23 THE PRESIDENT: Objection upheld.

24 Q And if any such national policy was ever
25 decided it was never confided to you by anyone

1 connected with it, was it?

2 COLONEL IVANOV: Objection on the same
3 grounds.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Objection upheld.

5 Q The war didn't start in 1943 at any rate,
6 did it?

7 THE PRESIDENT: Major Blakeney, you must
8 not persist in asking questions like that. They are
9 offensive to the Tribunal. They are a waste of time
10 which cannot be justified under any circumstances.

11 MR. BLAKENEY: I am very sorry to be con-
12 sidered offensive to the Tribunal. I had no such
13 intention whatever. I feel that an affidavit like
14 this should be offensive to the Tribunal and that I
15 am in duty bound to inquire into what this man knows,
16 if anything.

17 COLONEL IVANOV: I object to the counsel
18 making such statements from the lectern in connection
19 with the document which has already been accepted by
20 the Court, admitted into evidence by the Court, and
21 in connection with which the Court has already made
22 its conclusions.

23 THE PRESIDENT: There is no need to add
24 your objections to the Court's, Colonel Ivanov.

25 Q Now, let's just sum up your whole testimony.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Do no such thing.

2 Q In discussing war plans in your affidavit
3 you were really talking about operations plans to go
4 into effect in the event of hostilities, weren't you?

5 COLONEL IVANOV: I object because the new
6 group of repetitive questions is being asked now.
7 These questions have been already put to the witness.

8 MR. BLAKENEY: I have never put any such
9 question to this witness.

10 THE PRESIDENT: It is an attempt to get him
11 to summarize his evidence. It is not intended to get
12 any new fact. If he has left anything in doubt it
13 may be cleared up, but we do not want you to summarize
14 his evidence and get his concurrence or disagreement.

15 MR. BLAKENEY: I submit that the whole
16 Soviet phase turns on the difference between plans
17 for war and plans for operations, and that when a
18 witness comes in here and testifies about war plans
19 I have a right to ask him whether he doesn't know
20 that those plans were in fact operations plans.

21 THE PRESIDENT: Nothing in his affidavit
22 will qualify him to testify in this Court beyond his
23 capacity. If we want that question answered, if it
24 is not one for us to decide, we will get it from
25 people who know how to answer it, who are experts.

1 We do not want this junior officer to attempt to
2 solve for us what may be a major problem, assuming
3 we have not to solve it for ourselves from the
4 evidence we hear in the ordinary way.

5 Q You are an ordinary prisoner of war, aren't
6 you?

7 A Yes, I am a prisoner of war.

8 Q Have you been tried for any war crime or
9 offense against the USSR?

10 A No, never.

11 Q Have you been charged with any?

12 A No.

13 Q When were you taken prisoner by the Soviet
14 forces?

15 A September 5, 1945.

16 Q Have you been a prisoner ever since?

17 A Yes.

18 Q Do you know why you have not been repatriated
19 to Japan?

20 A I do not know.

21 Q Have you been told whether you would be
22 returned to Siberia after testifying here?

23 A Yes.

24 Q Yes what, that you will be returned?

25 A Yes, I was told that I shall be brought back.

1 Q How many times have you been interrogated
2 since you have been a prisoner of war of the Soviet
3 forces?

4 A About ten times.

5 Q Have you been imprisoned at any time during
6 your captivity as prisoner of war?

7 A No.

8 MR. BLAKENEY: Does anyone else wish to
9 cross-examine?

10 I presume that concludes the cross-examina-
11 tion.

12 COLONEL IVANOV: I have three or four
13 questions to this witness. May I begin after the
14 recess?

15 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen
16 minutes.

17 (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was
18 taken until 1100, after which the proceed-
19 ings were resumed as follows:)
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MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: Major Blakeney.

MR. BLAKENEY: Colonel Ivanov has kindly
agreed that I may return here a moment on a matter
which I overlooked.

In connection with the cross-examination of
this witness, I wish to refer the Tribunal to the
defense evidence bearing on the points covered herein,
and, specifically, the cross-examination of the wit-
ness SEJIMA, Ruizo, beginning at page 8,093 of the
record; the cross-examination of the witness
MATSUMURA, Tomokazu, beginning at page 8,138 of the
record; the direct testimony of the same witness
beginning at page 23,282 of the record and passim
thereafter; the direct testimony of the witness
KASAHARA, Yukio, beginning at page 23,189 of the
record; and the direct testimony of the witness
TANAKA, Shinichi, beginning at page 23,302 of the
record.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Ivanov.

COLONEL IVANOV: With the permission of the
Tribunal, I will put to this witness four questions.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY COLONEL IVANOV:

1 Q Mr. Witness, in spots of what large units
2 of the Japanese Army and during what period of time
3 did you serve as deciphering officer?

4 A I was code officer with the Mongolian
5 Stationary Army Headquarters from March, 1941, to
6 July, 1943. I was on duty at the Kwantung Army Head-
7 quarters from August, 1943, to August, 1945.

8 Q With what matters did the deciphered com-
9 munications in these spots deal?

10 A With operations, matters pertaining to
11 intelligence.

12 Q What was the form of your personal partici-
13 pation in the deciphering work? I mean the extent of
14 your knowledge.

15 A First, the handling of codes; second, the
16 compilation of code books; the direction and carry-
17 ing out of coding and decoding of messages going out
18 of headquarters and coming into headquarters. The
19 decoding of messages pertaining to ordinary matters
20 was done by non-commissioned officers and others of
21 equal or lower rank, but those pertaining to important
22 ones were handled by the officers themselves, includ-
23 ing me.

24 Q From whom did you hear the secret information,
25 about which you spoke in your affidavit, and what were

1 the positions of these persons and the extent of their
2 knowledge?

3 A I heard from various people: From Lieuten-
4 ant Colonel ISSHIKI, Masao, Chief Signal Officer of
5 the Mongolian Stationary Army in 1941; from Lieuten-
6 ant Colonel TOMURA, Morio, Chief Signal Officer of
7 the Kwantung Army; from Major KOBAYASHI, Taro, Chief
8 of the Code Section of the Kwantung Army; with regard
9 to the Kantokuen in 1941, from Captain HATTORI who
10 was an officer attached to the Code Section of the
11 Kwantung Army. These are persons from whom I have
12 received information.

13 Q And, now the last question. Replying to
14 the defense, you stated that you had been interrogated
15 ten times. Tell the Court: Were you interrogated
16 in connection with the matters pertaining to this
17 Tribunal or pertaining to some other problems?

18 A I was interrogated in connection with this
19 Tribunal once. On all other occasions, I was ques-
20 tioned with regard to my previous duties.

21 COLONEL IVANOV: May the witness be excused
22 on the usual terms, if there are no additional ques-
23 tions, so that he can be transferred to the proper
24 jurisdiction.

25 THE PRESIDENT: He is released on the usual

1 terms.

2 (Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

3 - - -

4 COLONEL IVANOV: I now call prosecution
5 witness MURAKAMI, Keisaku.

6 - - -

7 K E I S A K U M U R A K A M I, called as a witness
8 on behalf of the prosecution, being first duly
9 sworn, testified through Japanese interpreters
10 as follows:

11 DIRECT EXAMINATION

12 BY COLONEL IVANOV:

13 Q Mr. Witness, state your full name.

14 A MURAKAMI, Keisaku.

15 Q What is your age?

16 A Fifty nine.

17 Q What position did you hold just prior to the
18 surrender of Japan?

19 A Commander of the 3rd Army.

20 Q What was your rank at that time?

21 A Lieutenant General.

22 Q Are you at present a prisoner of war of the
23 Soviet Army?

24 A Yes, I am receiving the treatment of a
25 prisoner of war.

1 COLONEL IVANOV: May the witness be shown
2 exhibit 722?

3 (Whereupon, a document was handed
4 to the witness.)

5 Q Is that your affidavit and did you sign it?

6 A Yes.

7 Q Are the contents thereof true and correct?

8 A Yes, true and correct.

9 Q Did you give your testimony truthfully and
10 without any duress?

11 A I wrote this from my own conscience, volun-
12 tarily.

13 COLONEL IVANOV: If the Tribunal please,
14 separate excerpts from exhibit 722 have been read in
15 court, and they are at page 7,576 of the record.
16 With the Tribunal's permission, I shall read one
17 question and one answer from exhibit 722, which were
18 from the affidavit of MURAKAMI, which haven't been
19 read before. It is at the bottom of page 3 of the
20 English text and at the top of page 4 of the same
21 text:

22 "Q. What were the tasks of the Research
23 Institute of Total Mobilization in 1943?

24 "A. First, we were interested in the maxi-
25 mum increase of the production of aircraft and

1 factories, and we set ourselves the task of producing
2 forty thousand aircraft a year. Second, we were
3 occupied with the problem of increasing the produc-
4 tion of sea vessels. We set ourselves the task of
5 producing vessels with the total tonnage of one and
6 a half million tons a year. Third, we were interested
7 in exports of products from Manchuria, Korea, and
8 from the Southern regions (Annam, Siam) to Japan.
9 We had a shortage of 1,500,000 tons of rice a year.
10 Fourth, the question of dispersion of the population
11 and industry in case of air raids was studied. Fifth,
12 the sphere of foreign policy, we set ourselves the
13 task of studying the problems of consolidation of
14 the bloc of Eastern Asia countries under Japanese
15 hegemony."

16 Q Mr. Witness, did you not hold in 1943 the
17 position of Director of the Research Institute of
18 Total War?

19 A Yes, I was.
20
21
22
23
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25

1 COLONEL IVANOV: May the witness be shown
2 prosecution document No. 2152-A.

3 (Whereupon, a document was handed
4 to the witness.)

5 Q Is that your affidavit; was it written by
6 you in your own handwriting and did you sign it?

7 A This affidavit was written in my own hand-
8 writing and signed by me.

9 Q Are the contents thereof true and correct?

10 A Yes.

11 COLONEL IVANOV: If the Tribunal please,
12 I offer prosecution document No. 2152-A in evidence.
13 This is an additional affidavit of the witness
14 MURAKAMI, Keisaku.

15 MR. BLAKENEY: If the Tribunal please, the
16 defense objects to the reception of this affidavit.
17 The prosecution's case in chief has been closed for
18 almost nine months now, the Soviet phase thereof for
19 a full year. There can be no reason for its being
20 reopened now for the reception of additional evidence,
21 except perhaps in the case of such as was not and
22 with the exercise of diligence could not have been
23 found until now. Newly discovered evidence this
24 affidavit certainly is not. With one or two exceptions
25 every fact testified to in this document is such as

1 could and, if the prosecution considered it to have
2 been probative value, should have been put in in the
3 case in chief. The witness had been in the custody
4 of the Soviet authorities for some seven months
5 at the time the original affidavit was signed, for
6 fourteen months at the time that it was offered in
7 evidence. The prosecution had adequate time to
8 prepare the witness' testimony.

9 This document now tendered consists wholly
10 of additional details in expansion of the witness'
11 earlier testimony. It is fairly clear, I submit,
12 that this novel method of attempting to repair
13 weaknesses in the original prosecution's case is a
14 result of the opportunity offered by the prosecution's
15 having heard the defense's general Manchurian and
16 Russian evidence. There is not one word of this
17 evidence which could not properly have found place
18 in the case in chief and which, therefore, can be
19 offered in rebuttal. That is not quite correct;
20 one part of this affidavit which could not have
21 found place in the case in chief is the witness'
22 statement, at the top of page 2, of the contents of
23 a document which he does not produce or attempt to
24 account for.

25 Apparently the Soviet phase of the

1 prosecution's case is never to end. We have been
2 threatened repeatedly with the production of more
3 evidence "as soon as it could be got from Moscow";
4 when the Tribunal expressed some dubiety over this,
5 it was hinted that all this matter would be tendered
6 in rebuttal. When the Tribunal mentioned that there
7 were limits to what could properly be denominated
8 rebuttal, this method of bolstering up the case in
9 chief has now been devised. I am informed that one,
10 at least, of the defendants, who, his case already
11 closed, is now freshly attacked by some of the
12 allegations contained in these newly prepared
13 affidavits, feels that he must request leave to
14 reopen his case to answer the new charges; doubtless
15 others will do likewise. This method of introducing
16 prosecution evidence long after the close of the
17 prosecution's case is a method which, we submit,
18 does not comport with justice, with expedition, or
19 with orderliness. It is submitted that this
20 supplemental affidavit should be rejected in its
21 entirety.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Major Blakeney --

23 MR. BLAKENEY: Of course, should it be
24 admitted we must insist on the deletion of the
25 statement of contents of the document on page 2.

1 MR. BLEWETT: If the Tribunal please, I
2 object on behalf of the defendant TOJO to the
3 introduction or the reception of this document.
4 One-half the affidavit pertains to evidence which
5 was already in evidence, which is exhibit 688-A, and
6 which is a draft of the extracts from the Plan for
7 the Establishment of Greater East Asia which is
8 almost quoted verbatim by this witness who, no doubt,
9 has only seen the document within the last few days.

10 The evidence pertaining to that subject
11 has also been fully covered by the prosecution,
12 particularly that beginning with page 8816 of the
13 record, and it has also been covered by the defense
14 on page 27,066. There is ample evidence in the
15 record pertaining to that first portion of this
16 affidavit, if your Honors please, in more substantial
17 nature than this witness can testify and this man
18 can certainly be of little help to any of us in that
19 respect.

20 The latter half of his affidavit pertains
21 to the period beginning in March, 1943 onwards, after
22 the Pacific War had begun. We submit, if your Honors
23 please, that that is entirely immaterial to this
24 investigation.

25 We also submit, if your Honors please, that

1 this witness was brought here for purposes of cross-
2 examination on his original affidavit.

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1 THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is so, and as a
2 result of bringing him here while the defense case
3 was being put, they are now in a position to re-open
4 their case. It is an easy way of having the case re-
5 opened. However, we are not bound by rules of tech-
6 nical procedure and it is well within the competence
7 of this court to allow the U.S.S.R. prosecution to
8 re-open its case, and they have done so.

9 As far as the additional evidence is con-
10 cerned, it is covered by the ruling we gave a day or
11 two ago; but as to whether this particular evidence
12 should be admitted is a question to be determined,
13 perhaps, on other grounds which have been raised. I
14 will take the views of my colleagues on this.

15 COLONEL IVANOV: Shall I first state my reply
16 to the defense objection, or should I do what your
17 Honor said, now tender this document in evidence?

18 THE PRESIDENT: You may reply fully.

19 COLONEL IVANOV: Your Honor, there was a
20 precedent in the court already in connection with the
21 witness TAKEBE, and I confine myself only to mentioning
22 it.

23 Your Honor, we submit that now, due to the
24 prosecution witnesses being called to appear before the
25 Tribunal, the individual phases of the defense have

1 been temporarily suspended, and the procedure used
2 during the presentation of the general phases of the
3 prosecution evidence should apply to the examination
4 of these witnesses.

5 The affidavit of MURAKAMI, Keisaku, former
6 director of the Research Institute of Total War, has
7 great probative value for the Tribunal as objective
8 evidence of the real importance of the worth of the
9 Institute for the development of Japanese aggression.
10 The witness MURAKAMI is not going to give general
11 information of a repetitive nature already known to
12 the Tribunal, but will speak of specific undeniable
13 facts which will assist the Tribunal to appraise fair-
14 ly the actions of the accused connected with the above-
15 mentioned institute.

16 The documents mentioned in the additional
17 affidavit of MURAKAMI are, in substance, exhibits.
18 They will be shown to the witness, and the objection
19 of the defense pertaining to this is unfounded. In
20 presenting MURAKAMI's affidavit the prosecution tries
21 to save time and avoid further examination in chief
22 on the issue which, unfortunately, was dealt with only
23 in part in the first affidavit that was drawn up in
24 March, 1946, that is, prior to the beginning of this
25 trial, when the requirements of this Tribunal were not

known to us.

1 In the case of the witness TAKEBE, Rokuzo,
2 the defense applied to be permitted to present some
3 additional evidence. We do not object that the same
4 procedure be taken in connection with this additional
5 affidavit. The prosecution contends that there are
6 sufficient legal grounds for this affidavit to be
7 accepted, and in addition, considerations of the fair-
8 ness of the trial by which the Court is guided. The
9 presentation of this affidavit in rebuttal would
10 apparently be in the interest of fairness of these
11 trials and in the interest of saving time.

12 That is all I have to say, your Honor.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, I understand that
14 the Members of the Court who think you should be
15 allowed to do this do so because they assume this evi-
16 dence could be given in rebuttal, and that it might
17 well be given now in order to save keeping the wit-
18 nesses here. I think that I should tell you the reason.
19 And they do point out that the witnesses could be cross-
20 examined by those defendants who are affected by the
21 evidence.
22

23 By a majority the objection is overruled and
24 the document admitted on the usual terms.

25 MR. FURNESS: If the Court please --

1 THE PRESIDENT: I also should point out that
2 any accused who is affected may not only have the
3 right to cross-examine but also to give additional
4 evidence later.

5 Major Furness.

6 MR. FURNESS: If the Court please, we assume
7 that no ruling has been made as to the extent of re-
8 buttal testimony.

9 THE PRESIDENT: Well, as I pointed out, the
10 grounds of admission assume that this evidence, at all
11 events, would be admissible in rebuttal. However,
12 that is the decision of the Tribunal and we don't want
13 any discussion about it. It is well within the compe-
14 tence of the Tribunal to come to that conclusion; the
15 Charter says so.

16 MR. FURNESS: Before any general ruling on
17 the extent of rebuttal is made --

18 THE PRESIDENT: Major Furness, there is no
19 occasion at this stage to deal with the matter you
20 are about to raise. You can deal with it when it comes
21 up again.

22 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution document
23 2152-A will receive exhibit No. 3372.

24 (Whereupon, the document above
25 referred to was marked prosecution exhibit 3372
and received in evidence.)

COLONEL IVANOV: If the Court please, I
shall now read the affidavit of MURAKAMI, Keisaku:

"I, MURAKAMI, Keisaku, former Lt. Gen. of the
Japanese Army, born in 1889, take oath and depose as
follows:

"From March 8, 1943 to December 20 of the
same year, I was director of the Research Institute of
Total War in Tokyo. The Institute was established in
the autumn of 1940 in accordance with the Imperial
Ordinance and was a government organ for the research
of basic problems of total warfare and for the train-
ing of personnel necessary in the various ministries
for the conducting of the total warfare. The director
of the Institute was under the direct control of the
Prime Minister.

"On the day of my appointment to that post, I
was received by Premier TOJO, Hideki in his office at
the official residence. TOJO handed me a written order
appointing me director of the Research Institute of
Total War, and said that, 'at present, the Institute
should make supreme efforts in the study of the national
ideology of the Japanese Empire /NIPPON KOKUTAI KANNEN/
and in order to secure ultimate victory, it is necessary
that each student of the Institute be imbued with that
ideology.' In connection with the above object, Litt. D.
YAMADA, Takao, Director of JINGU KOGAKUKAN, Dr. HIRAIZUMI,

Professor of Tokyo Imperial University, and Rear

1 Admiral TERAMOTO, professor of the Naval College,
2 were invited to the Research Institute of Total War.

3 The Institute received various secret materials necessary
4 to carry on the research in the various problems concern-
5 ing total war from all the ministries, and besides, the
6 students of the Institute constantly received additional
7 secret data from their ministries and used them in
8 their researches.

9
10 "The Institute was sometimes given definite
11 research problems on total warfare from Premier TOJO,
12 but usually the Institute itself selected the most
13 important problems of the time for investigation.
14 Vice Admiral ENDO, my predecessor in the post of
15 Director of the Research Institute of Total War, said
16 to me in March 1943 that 'The Research in the adminis-
17 tration of the occupied areas in the Greater East Asia
18 territory, occupied by the Japanese Army, was personally
19 entrusted by Premier TOJO.' The above secret research,
20 that is, the draft for the administration of the occupied
21 areas in the Greater East Asia Occupation Areas, had
22 been completed before I assumed the post of the
23 Director of the Institute and I read it through.
24 Besides the above, I read through the draft for the
25 establishment of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity

1 Sphere drawn up by the Research Institute of Total War.

2 The said draft provided for the establishment of:

3 "(A) The central area including Manchuria,
4 Soviet Maritime Province, and North China, which would
5 be united by Japan;

6 "(B) The Smaller Coprosperity Sphere, includ-
7 ing besides the above, Eastern Siberia, China and
8 Indo-China;

9 "(C) The Greater Coprosperity Sphere, including
10 besides the Smaller Coprosperity Sphere, Australia, India
11 and Pacific Islands.

12 "The various problems of the further conduct
13 of war by Japan in the near future, i.e., the period
14 from 1943 to 1944, were investigated by the Institute
15 under my direction.

16 "In my interrogation on March 28, 1946, I
17 already stated the plans worked out by the Institute
18 with regard to the increase in the output of aircraft
19 up to 40,000 planes a year, the increase in the
20 construction of vessels with the total tonnage of
21 1,500,000 tons a year and other matters.

22 "The draft plans worked out by the Institute
23 were sent to the Prime Minister and all the ministries
24 concerned in order to have them carried into practical
25 use. Compared with the other ministries, the War and

1 Navy Ministries were most closely connected with the
2 Institute, and that is why the Institute was headed
3 alternately by a general or an admiral.

4 "When I was director of the Institute, it had
5 about forty students consisting of responsible officials
6 of the respective ministries whose rank were usually
7 equal to the ranks of major or lieutenant colonel, and
8 some representatives of banks and companies.

9 "At the opening ceremony at the Institute in
10 April 1943, there were present Mr. SUZUKI, Minister of
11 State without portfolio and concurrently President of
12 the Planning Board; Mr. HASHIDA, Minister of Education,
13 and Mr. HOSHINO, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, who
14 participated in the establishment of the Institute in
15 1940.

16 "Chiefs of departments and sections concerned
17 of the ministries gave lectures at the Institute,
18 Major General ARISUE, Chief of the 2nd Section of the
19 Army General Staff, Colonel NISHIURA, Chief of the
20 Military Affairs section of the War Ministry, etc.,
21 gave lectures.

22 "When I was director of the Institute, theo-
23 retical researches and maneuvers were conducted with
24 the express purpose of rendering practical assistance
25 and data to the Cabinet and the respective ministries.

1 When carrying out these researches and maneuvers, they
2 were conducted under strict consideration of the actual
3 international and internal situations, and were based
4 only on the real strength and resources of the state.

5 "In the summer of 1943, at a conference of
6 the Institute advisors, matters concerning the students
7 from the respective ministries to be accepted in 1944
8 were discussed and decided on. HOSHINO, Chief Secretary
9 of the Cabinet, and the Vice Ministers of the respective
10 ministries were present at this conference.

11 "At the graduation ceremony in December 1943,
12 TOJO, HOSHINO, SUZUKI and other ministers were present.
13 Prime Minister TOJO stated in his speech at the ceremony
14 that, 'the Pacific War has entered into its decisive
15 phase and therefore the personnel of all the ministries
16 must make intense efforts. And as regards a research of
17 the students this term was only a short term research
18 from April to December 1943, the students should not
19 be satisfied with what they had achieved. Although the
20 students were given a firm foundation in the national
21 ideology of the Japanese Empire, this ideology should
22 be thoroughly grasped by the students.' Prime Minister
23 TOJO further stressed that they should all endeavor
24 to accomplish the war, firmly believing that Japan would
25 by all means be the winner.

1 "Due to the shortage of personnel, the number
2 was cut down by half in 1944. Furthermore, in 1944 the
3 Institute was ordered to conduct only researches which
4 were considered most important by the Cabinet. The
5 Research Institute of Total War was closed down after
6 TOJO resigned from the post of Prime Minister in 1944.

7 "MURAKAMI, Keisaku

8 "October 20, 1947. Tokyo"

9 If the Tribunal please, may the witness be
10 shown the two exhibits which are mentioned in his
11 additional affidavit?

12 May the witness be shown Exhibit 690?

13 (Whereupon, a document was shown
14 to the witness.)

15 Q Mr. Witness, did you see or did you read
16 this document when you were Director of the Total War
17 Research Institute? Look this document through.

18 A Yes. I have read it.

19 MR. IVANOV: May the witness be shown Exhibit
20 1336?

21 (Whereupon, a document was shown
22 to the witness.)

23 Q Mr. Witness, did you see or did you read
24 this document when you were Director of the Total War
25 Research Institute?

1 A Yes, I have had occasion to read it.

2 COLONEL IVANOV: That is all I have.

3 The defense may cross-examine the witness

4 MURAKAMI, Keisaku.

5 THE PRESIDENT: Major Blakeney.

6 Well, I think it is rather late to start a
7 lengthy cross-examination, if there is to be one.

8 We will adjourn until half past one.

9 (Whereupon, at 1155, a recess was
10 taken.)

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AFTERNOON SESSION

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3 The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at
4 1330.

5 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
6 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Ivanov.

8 - - -

9 K E I S A K U M U R A K A M I, called as a
10 witness on behalf of the prosecution, resumed
11 the stand and testified through Japanese
12 interpreters as follows:

13 COLONEL IVANOV: Your Honor, on the basis
14 of an agreement reached with the defense, I want to
15 make the following statement.

16 Your Honor, before the recess, due to an
17 error, the witness was shown exhibit 1336, which is
18 a copy and part of exhibit 688, whereas I intended to
19 show the complete original, that is, exhibit No. 688.
20 With the Tribunal's permission I will repair this
21 error now and it will take two or three minutes.

22 May the witness be shown exhibit 688?

DIRECT EXAMINATION

23
24 BY COLONEL IVANOV (Continued):

25 Q Witness, did you see and read this original

1 document while you were director of the Total
2 Warfare Research Institute?

3 A Yes, I have seen it.

4 COLONEL IVANOV: That is all, your Honor.
5 The defense may now cross-examine the witness.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Major Blakeney.

7 MR. BLAKENEY: Before cross-examining, may
8 I remind the Tribunal that some considerable portions
9 of the affidavit of this witness were stricken before
10 it was admitted into evidence as exhibit No. 722
11 (record page 7,575). Let me also mention that from
12 the affidavit as admitted the prosecution read orig-
13 inally one answer of seven lines, no more. We
14 recognize, however, that the remainder is in evidence
15 against us and available for cross-examination.

16 THE PRESIDENT: The court copy does not show
17 how much was rejected.

18 MR. BLAKENEY: I can state it from the
19 record if you desire to know. Shall I?

20 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, please.

21 MR. BLAKENEY: On page 2, the last answer
22 and the question to which it is responsive; on page 5,
23 the second question and the answer thereto and on the
24 same page 5, the last question and answer which con-
25 tinues through to the end of the affidavit on page 6.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

2 CROSS-EXAMINATION

3 BY MR. BLAKENEY:

4 Q Witness, where were you during the spring,
5 summer and autumn of 1941?

6 A I was on the front lines on the west of
7 Hankow in Central China but in September of that
8 year I returned to Japan.

9 Q What post did you occupy thereafter
10 through the remainder of that year?

11 A At first I was attached to the army school
12 of Military Science and Technique as its principal
13 and this school's name was later changed to School
14 of Military Science.

15 Q At what time did your connection with that
16 institution commence?

17 A From September 26, 1941.

18 Q During the year 1941 did you attend
19 cabinet meetings?

20 A I have not.

21 Q You were not at any time during 1941 attached
22 to the War Ministry, were you?

23 A No, I have not.

24 Q And, of course, you were not attached to the
25 Foreign Ministry, were you?

1 A No, I have not.

2 Q During the summer and autumn of 1941 did
3 you attend liaison conferences?

4 A I have not attended them.

5 Q Then how do you know so much about the
6 Japanese-American diplomatic questions in 1941
7 which you testified to in your affidavit?

8 A I was informed by a member of the Total
9 War Research Institute when I was director of the
10 institute from a member of the institute coming
11 from the Foreign Office.

12 Q What was his name?

13 A His surname was NISHIMURA. I have forgotten
14 his first name.

15 Q When was it that he informed you of these
16 matters?

17 A I think in the spring of 1943.

18 Q What did he tell you?

19 A You mean?

20 Q What did he tell you about the Japanese-
21 American diplomatic question which enabled you to
22 testify on it in your affidavit?

23 A It was on the 17th of April, 1941, as I
24 heard it then, that a reply came from the United
25 States Government to the effect that if Japan would

1 withdraw all her troops from China then the United
2 States would recognize Manchukuo's independence and
3 approve of the economic development of that area;
4 and, moreover, that the United States will use its
5 good offices in prevailing upon Chiang Kai-shek to
6 bring about a settlement between Japan and China.
7 This information was imparted not only to me but to
8 a meeting of the research students of the institute
9 at a meeting held amongst them.

10 Q A sort of lecture, was it?

11 A Yes.

12 Q What position did that man, your informant,
13 occupy in the Foreign Ministry?

14 A Before coming to the Total War Research
15 Institute he was with the Bureau of Treaties of the
16 Foreign Office.

17 Q And as such was he officially connected
18 with the Japanese-American negotiations?

19 A I think he did.

20 Q What are the provisions of Article 95 of
21 the criminal code of the R.S.F.S.R.?

22 A I do not know very well but I think it
23 corresponds to--

24 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. President, will you
25 be good enough to hold on just a moment?

1 MR. BLAKENEY: I think it means Russian
2 Soviet Federated Socialist Republics.

3 THE INTERPRETER: No, it isn't that. It's
4 the witness' reply.

5 A (Continuing) It corresponds with what is
6 known in Japan as perjury or giving false evidence.

7 Q What penalty does it provide?

8 THE PRESIDENT: This is a very important
9 witness but his testimony on these matters is not
10 worth hearing. I suppose you really want to ask him
11 what the Russian interrogator told him about that
12 section of the Russian law.

13 MR. BLAKENEY: There are several consider-
14 ations, your Honor. One of them is, he swears that
15 he was warned of his responsibility under that
16 article and I think it might be of some interest to
17 know what responsibility is imposed by that article.

18 THE PRESIDENT: Apparently it is a warning
19 against perjury, not in favor of it.

20 MR. BLAKENEY: I should think so.

21 THE PRESIDENT: Will the witness tell us
22 what he was told by the Russian interrogator about
23 the penalties for making a false statement?

24 THE WITNESS: Well, there was nothing said
25 in particular and it is only from my own knowledge,

1 which I believe is the same with -- is common
2 knowledge true to and common among all nations,
3 and that is that as far as I am concerned there is
4 no penalty and that I am here testifying to what I
5 believe to be the truth without any consideration
6 or concern as to penalties -- and without any concern
7 with penalties whatsoever. I have only set forth
8 the facts.

9 COLONEL IVANOV: Your Honor, the prosecution
10 submits that the replies as given by the witness
11 cover the matter and if the defense counsel wants
12 to elucidate the contents of this article of the
13 penal code he may find it out from the members of
14 the Soviet delegation in this Tribunal.

15 MR. BLAKENEY: Yes, I should be glad to
16 see it if they would supply it.

17 Q But as for you, Mr. Witness, I was trying
18 to test your memory. You swear that you were warned
19 of your responsibility under that article--
20

21 COLONEL IVANOV: I submit that the witness
22 should not reply to this question. This is sheer
23 argument which should not interest the Tribunal.

24 THE PRESIDENT: It does not at present.
25 This witness, as I said before, is a most important
witness and we would like his cross-examination to

1 deal with important matters.

2 Q Has anything occurred since you have been
3 a prisoner of war to affect your mind or your memory?

4 A No, nothing in particular.

5 Q Is your memory as good now as when you
6 wrote your affidavit?

7 THE PRESIDENT: Do not ask him; test him
8 by cross-examination on it. That is the way to
9 convince us.

10 THE INTERPRETER: The witness said:
11 Generally, my memory is reliable.

12 THE PRESIDENT: We will see when we hear
13 him cross-examined in relation to his affidavit.

14 Q Has your health been good since you have
15 been a prisoner of war?

16 A Yes.

17 Q All the time?

18 A Yes; however, my blood pressure has been
19 rather high from sometime ago.

20 Q You state in your affidavit that you know
21 that in 1942 there was a Japanese plan of attack on
22 the Soviet Union from Manchuria. Did you know this
23 at the time?

24 A No, not at that time. I heard of this
25 when I took over the post as commander of the Third

1 Army from my predecessor.

2 Q Who was your predecessor?

3 A Lieutenant General NEMOTO.

4 Q Give us the details of this plan as you
5 learned them at that time.

6 A From the fall of 1944 the duty of the Third
7 Army became purely defensive but prior to that time
8 its duty was to take the offensive in the direction
9 of Voroshilov.

10 Q Is that all?

11 A Yes, that is all.

12 Q That is all you learned about the plan for
13 attack of 1942?

14 A Yes, but I should like to make a correction
15 with respect to the year 1942. The plan was an
16 offensive one up to 1944.

17 Q You mean that the plan for 1943 also was
18 offensive?
19

20 A Yes.
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1 Q What did the 1943 operations plan provide?

2 A I know nothing about that.

3 Q Do you mean that your predecessor told you of
4 the 1942 plan but not of the 1943 plan?

5 A No. That is, there is some mistake there
6 What I meant to say, if I may speak in greater detail,
7 is that the plan changed from the offensive to the
8 defensive in 1944 and that up to that year, that is, 1944,
9 this plan, this offensive plan, continued to exist.

10 Q You mean the same plan continued throughout
11 several years?

12 A Yes.

13 Q Do not you know it is a fact that operations
14 plans were drawn annually?

15 A Yes, I know that as far as those details are
16 concerned. But I am trying to say that the general
17 policy of offensive continued to exist through those
18 years.

19 Q I am not asking about general policies. I am
20 asking you about the statement on page 4 of your affi-
21 davit that, "I know that in 1942 there was a plan of an
22 attack on the Soviet Union from the Manchurian military
23 base." Now that isn't a policy, is it? That is a plan.

24 A Yes, an offensive plan or a plan for offensive
25 action, but the year 1942 just was cited here as a date.

1 THE INTERPRETER: Correction of the previous
2 interpretation: Yes, it was an offensive plan but the
3 year 1942 merely cites the general standard when the
4 operations plan was in effect but it doesn't mean that
5 an offensive plan was confined only to the year 1942.

6 Q All right. Now I ask you again, was there an
7 offensive plan in 1943?

8 COLONEL IVANOV: The witness has --

9 MR. BLAKENEY: I can't hear.

10 THE PRESIDENT: There has been a failure in
11 the IBM.

12 COLONEL IVANOV: The witness has at least twice
13 replied to this question so the question is repetitive
14 and I object to it. The witness has at least twice
15 positively replied to this question. He has answered
16 in the affirmative.

17 THE PRESIDENT: His answer in his affidavit
18 should be enough. He was asked if he knew anything
19 about those proposed attacks and he mentioned only one
20 year. I don't know why he should be asked of other
21 years.

22 MR. BLAKENEY: I would really like to find out
23 how much he does know about them, but if the Tribunal
24 is satisfied I will be.

25 THE PRESIDENT: We certainly won't find it

1 against you that he knew of one in 1941 and another in
2 1943 unless he says so, and he hasn't said so.

3 MR. BLAKENEY: I assure your Honor that isn't
4 my intention, but perhaps I would like him to say so.

5 THE PRESIDENT: If you wish him to say something
6 against you you are at liberty to ask him. Apparently
7 you assume if he says something against you the Court
8 won't believe him. You may be mistaken.

9 MR. BLAKENEY: Apparently your Honor assumes
10 that the Tribunal will disregard defense evidence, but
11 it may not be so. We may have good evidence of our own.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Why you want to make this
13 prosecution witness a stronger witness against you than
14 he is, I don't know. My concern is to save time.

15 MR. BLAKENEY: My concern is to save my clients'
16 lives and I believe that I should be permitted, if I can,
17 to lead this witness to contradict the testimony of
18 every other witness, prosecution and defense.

19 THE PRESIDENT: I think you are talking for
20 the sake of talking, Major Blakeney. They would have
21 to say that this man knew things which he did not know.

22 MR. BLAKENEY: I am trying to demonstrate --

23 THE PRESIDENT: To contradict him the prosecu-
24 tion's witnesses would have to say that he, this witness,
25 knew of preparations for an attack on Russia. If that

1 is so I will allow you to ask the question, but I know it
2 isn't so.

3 MR. BLAKENEY: That wasn't my point at all.

4 THE INTERPRETER: The witness said, "I should
5 like to say a word."

6 MR. BLAKENEY: But if --

7 THE PRESIDENT: Your examination may continue
8 along these lines but at present I don't see what value
9 it is to you and it is taking up a lot of our time.

10 Q Was the 1942 plan for an attack on the Soviet
11 Union a routine annual operations plan or was it not?

12 A Yes, I think it was.

13 Q And did the annual routine operations plan
14 for 1943 similarly contemplate an attack on the Soviet
15 Union?

16 A Yes; as far as the Third Army was concerned
17 its plan was to conduct an attack in the direction of
18 Voroshilov.

19 Q That is in accordance with the 1943 annual
20 operations plan, is it?

21 A That is the way I understood it.

22 THE INTERPRETER: Slight correction: That is
23 the way I heard it.

24 Q Aside from the Third Army, what were the other
25 armies to do under these plans which you have mentioned?

1 A I did not hear anything about the other armies.

2 Q What was the time set for this attack on the
3 U.S.S.R. by the plan for attack which you have mentioned?

4 A I don't think there was any time.

5 Q Did you ever at any time under any plan of
6 operations or plan of attack learn of a time being set
7 for the attack?

8 A No, I have never heard of that. The plan was
9 that if hostilities broke out within the year, then the
10 plan was to go into operation and no possible time
11 limit could be set. That is as a matter of course.

12 THE INTERPRETER: Could not possibly be a plan
13 as to attack or not to attack in a certain year.

14 Q Therefore, your understanding was and your
15 instructions were, were they not, that these plans were
16 the annual operations plan to go into effect in the
17 event of hostilities from whatever cause?

18 A Yes, that is so.
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1 Q What about this increase in the strength of
2 the Kwantung Army in or before 1942 which you testi-
3 fied to? When was that?

4 A This took place in 1941.

5 Q What part of 1941?

6 A During the period from summer to fall.

7 Q How did you know of it?

8 A I was not directly connected, or I did not
9 directly participate in this plan. But while Com-
10 mander of the Third Army I conducted an inspection
11 of the area under my command and heard explanations
12 to that effect at various places in that area.

13 Q What was the extent of the increase in
14 strength in 1941?

15 A Your meaning? May I have that repeated again,
16 please?

17 Q What was the extent of the reinforcement of
18 the Kwantung Army in 1941 which you have testified to?

19 A Approximately 700,000, I think.

20 Q You don't mean an increase of 700,000, do
21 you?

22 A What I mean to say was that the army as a
23 whole reached that figure, 700,000.

24 Q But how many men were added to the army at
25 the time of that reinforcement to bring it up to this

1 total of 700,000?

2 A That I do not know.

3 Q Did this increase, this reinforcement or
4 increase in strength of the Kwantung Army in 1941
5 give it numerical superiority to the Soviet forces in
6 the Far East?

7 COLONEL IVANOV: Your Honor, this question
8 invites a conclusion of the witness. I would rather
9 prefer the defense counsel to conduct his cross-
10 examination with a view of establishing facts, and
11 not opinions of the witness and his conclusions.

12 MR. BLAKENEY: I didn't ask for his opinion.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Objection overruled.

14 Q You may answer the question.

15 A I do not understand which question.

16 (Whereupon, the Japanese court
17 reporter read.)

18 A No, I think the Kwantung Army's forces were
19 inferior.

20 Q Do you know by how much they were inferior?

21 A I do not know very well, but according to
22 various reports and rumors which were afloat and which
23 I heard, then the strength of the Soviet forces in the
24 Far East was at least 800,000.

25 Q Do you know how many divisions there were in

1 the Kwantung Army after the reinforcement of 1941?

2 A While I have no definite recollection, but
3 I think it was somewhere around 13 or 15 divisions.

4 Q Do you know how many divisions were in the
5 Kwantung Army at the time of your service as Commander
6 of the Third Army?

7 A Of course the strength was different at dif-
8 ferent times, and it is very difficult for me to give
9 you exact information as to what the strength was at
10 what time.

11 Q Well, from the time you took over command of
12 the Third Army, which was in 1944, did the strength of
13 the Kwantung Army decrease, increase, or remain about
14 the same?

15 A The Kwantung Army's strength steadily decreased
16 not only in quantity but in quality as well. As a re-
17 sult there was no chance whatsoever to take any offen-
18 sive, and they had to -- they were, that is, the army
19 was placed purely on the defensive, compelled to as-
20 sume the defensive.

21 Q Do you know from what time that decrease in
22 quality and in quantity commenced?

23 A Generally from around February 1944.

24 Q Now, in fact, this reinforcement which you
25 are talking about in 1941 was the so-called Kantokuen,

1 wasn't it?

2 A Yes.

3 Q And the Kantokuen was exactly that, wasn't
4 it, a reinforcement of the Kwantung Army against eventu-
5 alities?

6 A That is my belief also.

7 Q And it didn't in any way resemble a war plan,
8 did it?

9 A That I do not know.

10 Q You were a lieutenant general, weren't you?

11 A Yes, I was a lieutenant general, but I have
12 never participated in operational plan either of the
13 Manchurian National Army or of the Kwantung Army: De-
14 lete Manchurian Army to Japanese Army.

15 Q You are a rather well-known author on mili-
16 tary subjects, aren't you?

17 A No, I am not.

18 Q Haven't you written books on military his-
19 tory, supreme command, and allied subjects?

20 A Well, I wrote a book entitled "Senso Yoron,"
21 or the principles of warfare, quite a long time ago.
22 But that was the only book I have ever written.

23 Q Did you never write a book known as "Tosui
24 Sankosho"?
25

THE MONITOR: Will you spell it out?

1 MR. BLAKENEY: Tosui Sankosho.

2 THE MONITOR: Sankosho. Thank you.

3 A Well, this was a work undertaken at the War
4 College, Army War College, while I was there. It was
5 not written by me but it was compiled by me on the
6 basis of various studies made by the instructors at
7 the college. That is to say, it was compiled under
8 my supervision.

9 Q That was published under your name as author,
10 wasn't it?

11 A No.

12 Q You have been a specialist in Russian matters
13 throughout your army service, haven't you?

14 A I have not even once gone to the Second
15 Division of the General Staff Headquarters in connec-
16 tion with a study of Russian problems.

17 Q I didn't ask you that. I asked you if you
18 had not been a specialist in Russian matters through-
19 out your army career?

20 A No, I was not a specialist.

21 Q You read and speak the Russian language,
22 don't you?

23 A Yes, I can read and speak Russian.

24 Q And when you served as an instructor in
25 military schools and colleges you have taught subjects

1 connected with Russia, haven't you?

2 A No. I have only taught the history of war
3 and tactics.

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1 Q Did you ever teach Russian military his-
2 tory?

3 A Yes, I have.

4 Q Russian military tactics?

5 A Well, I have not taught Russian tactics as
6 such, but when I taught Japanese tactics I used as
7 an illustration tactics used by the Russians.

8 Q You did that in the Military Staff College,
9 for example?

10 A Yes.

11 Q But you don't mean to suggest, do you,
12 that in the Military Staff College instruction was not
13 given in the military history and tactics of other
14 nations as well? I mean as well as those of Russia.

15 A Well, I taught principally Russian tactics
16 vis-a-vis the Russian Army, especially in connection
17 with the history of the Russo-Japanese War as well as
18 the history or military history of Germany and
19 Austria.

20 Q Well, I don't believe you quite understood
21 my question. The question was: isn't it a fact that
22 in the Army Staff College instruction was given in
23 the military history and in the tactics of other
24 foreign nations as well as those of Russia?
25

A Yes, in the Army Staff College the military

1 history of Germany, Austria, and France, among
2 others, was taught.

3 Q But your own teaching centered around those
4 matters in connection with Russia because that was
5 the subject in which you were best qualified, didn't
6 it?

7 A I have never given lectures on the subject
8 of Russian questions.

9 Q Am I to understand from your affidavit that
10 your teachings were that Japan must engage in aggres-
11 sion to conquer territories in future wars? Was
12 that your teaching?

13 A This calls for some explanation.

14 Q All right. Let us have it.

15 A No, that is not my meaning at all. What I
16 mean to say is that the Japanese are a peaceful people
17 as a people, fundamentally speaking. But they cannot
18 long exist shoved into the narrow confines of these
19 small islands. That being the situation, it is
20 necessary that the Japanese expand overseas, particu-
21 larly expand on the continent of Asia; and it was
22 when there were influences which obstructed this
23 expansion that war broke out. Whether in the case of
24 the Sino-Japanese War or in the case of the Russo-
25 Japanese War, these wars broke out because of these

1 reasons. Furthermore, in order to be able to carry
2 on warfare, the natural resources of the continent
3 are essential and must be utilized. This fact is
4 well attested to by the late war, that is, the War
5 of Greater East Asia. And it was necessary to bring
6 from the continent large quantities of iron and coal
7 and more than ten million to twenty million koku of
8 cereals. And, therefore, as far as Japan was con-
9 cerned it was necessary that she have a strong foot-
10 hold on the continent politically, economically, and
11 militarily. This being the fact and this being the
12 reason, Japan strategically must always point to the
13 offensive. This is what the cold facts testify to,
14 and it is on the basis of this fundamental concept
15 that I taught the history of war. That is what I
16 mean by what I state in my affidavit.

17
18 Q Well, then, as I understand your answer,
19 your teaching was not that Japan must engage in
20 aggression to conquer territories in future wars; is
21 that right?

22 A Well, as I have said before, overseas expan-
23 sion was necessary for Japan as a nation; and while
24 undertaking such an expansion war may possibly occur,
25 if such a war occurred Japan must take the offensive
and gain control of certain strategic and vital areas.

1 This I told my classes was the lesson of military
2 history.

3 Q You say that the Japanese Army regarded
4 the Red Army as a future enemy; that is so, isn't it?

5 A Yes.

6 Q Were there any other land powers having
7 modern and efficient armies so placed that they
8 might offer the prospect of land warfare with Japan?

9 A No.

10 Q About this "Red Book" which you testified to,
11 what was the title of it?

12 A That was an infantry manual in connection
13 with the war against Russia.

14 THE MONITOR: Correction: This was an
15 infantry manual for combat against Soviet Russia.

16 Q Is that a description of it or is it the
17 title of it?

18 A I do not have any exact recollection as to
19 the title of the book, but if my memory serves me
20 correctly the title was "Taiso Gun Sento Ho," or
21 "Method of Combat vis-a-vis the Soviet Army."
22

23 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen
24 minutes.

25 (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was
taken until 1500, after which the proceedings

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were resumed as follows:)

1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Major Blakeney.

4 BY MR. BLAKENEY (Continued):

5 Q Tell us quite briefly, Mr. Witness, what
6 were the contents of the "Red Book"?

7 A I have forgotten the details, but I will
8 give you the general outline.

9 THE PRESIDENT: An outline could be very
10 lengthy. He does say what is in the book in one
11 of his answers on page 3. Do you really need any
12 more than that?

13 MR. BLAKENEY: I didn't want any more, your
14 Honor. That part was never read in evidence and I
15 thought he would tell us in one sentence the same
16 thing he had in his affidavit.

17 THE PRESIDENT: It is in evidence and you
18 may read that part, if you desire. In the answer he
19 says: "This book gave some instructions to the
20 Japanese officers what tactic methods had to be
21 applied by Japanese in order to conquer Russians and
22 to oppose our own tactics to that of Russians."
23

24 Q Now, were those tactics, those instructions
25 on tactics contained in the "Red Book", applicable

1 both to offense and defense?

2 A Yes.

3 Q When was the book published?

4 A I think it was first published in 1933 or
5 thereabouts.

6 Q But don't you say in your affidavit that it
7 was founded partly on the Soviet Battle Service
8 Regulations of 1936 as one of its sources?

9 A That means that Soviet publications were
10 used as reference when the book was revised in 1936.
11 That is, the Soviet publications of that year were
12 used as reference when a revision was made of this
13 "Red Book."

14 Q When was the revision made?

15 A I think the revision was made either in
16 1937 or 1938.

17 Q When was Marshall MUTO Inspector General of
18 Military Training?

19 A Up to September, 1932.

20 Q But didn't you say in your affidavit that
21 this book was issued when he was Inspector General?

22 A I did not say it was published. I said
23 that it was during the time of Marshall MUTO that
24 this book had been prepared or drawn up. The
25 publication of the book was some time after that.

1 Q By whom was the book published or circulated?

2 A I think during the tenure of office of
3 Marshall MUTO's successor.

4 Q I don't mean by what person. I mean by
5 what agency or organization was the book published.

6 A The book was both compiled and published
7 by the Inspector General of Military Training.

8 THE PRESIDENT: As I am reminded, it is
9 quite routine to publish in the British Army, and
10 no doubt in other armies, technical books of this
11 kind that are constantly revised and reissue them.

12 MR. BLAKENEY: If the Tribunal takes notice
13 of that fact, I will leave that question.

14 Q Coming to your new affidavit on the Total
15 War Research Institute. In the third paragraph
16 of page 1 thereof, you have stated the instructions
17 given to you by Premier TOJO when you were appointed
18 Director of that institute. Did you carry out those
19 instructions?
20

21 A Yes.

22 Q May I understand, then, that from that
23 statement in your affidavit, as well as the statement
24 on page 3 of later instructions given you by Premier
25 TOJO, that as Director of the Institute, your chief
interest was in spiritual training and education?

1 A Yes, spiritual education and study.

2 Q In fact, among the lecturers whom you
3 mention as having appeared before your student
4 body, was not Doctor YAMADA, the Director of the
5 Shinto Institute and a well-known Shinto Scholar?

6 A Yes.

7 Q And Rear-Admiral TERAMOTO was famous, was he
8 not, as an enthusiast for and an exponent for the
9 Zen sect of Buddhism?

10 THE PRESIDENT: How does that go to credit
11 or to any issue?

12 THE INTERPRETER: Prior to the President's
13 statement the witness said "Yes."

14 MR. BLAKENEY: Only to show the type of
15 activities of this institute.

16 Q Among the students --

17 THE PRESIDENT: Did the Institute deal with
18 those matters, Shintoism and Buddhism?

19 THE WITNESS: No, that was not the main
20 meaning at all. In order to understand the Japanese
21 concept of State, that is, the Kokutai, or fundamental
22 character of the Japanese State, it was necessary
23 that the study of this subject not be made from a
24 very small, narrow angle, but from a broad angle and
25 therefore authorities on Shintoism and Buddhism were

1 invited to contribute of their knowledge to the
2 study of this subject, together with other experts
3 on the subject, treating the subject from other
4 angles.

5 Q In fact, all of your lecturers who were
6 named in this affidavit came to you and lectured
7 by request of the Institute, did they not?

8 A Yes, that is so.
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1 Q And, these various ministers of state, whom
2 you mention as having been present on various ceremon-
3 ial occasions, came at the express request of the
4 Institute or you as its director, did they not?

5 A Yes. The ministers of state only attended
6 on ceremonial occasions, and invitations to them
7 were issued by the Institute.

8 Q Now, among the student body, commencing in
9 April, 1943, were there not ten students taken from
10 various civilian organizations?

11 A I do not recall the number, but there were
12 several.

13 Q Did those students pursue the same course
14 and engage in the same activities as all of the other
15 students?

16 A Yes, generally the same, but they handled
17 different subjects or different angles of the same
18 subject in accordance with their respective special-
19 ties.

20 Q That was true of all the students, wasn't
21 it?

22 A Yes.

23 Q But, had they all access to the same
24 materials?

25 A Yes, they were accessible to them in

1 accordance with their personal desires.

2 Q Now, among these students from civilian
3 organization, you had at that time at least two from
4 the newspapers, had you not?

5 A Yes.

6 Q There was at least one man from the Tokyo
7 Asahi and one from the Osaka Mainichi, wasn't there?

8 A Yes.

9 Q And, they, like all the rest, had access
10 to the materials, secret or otherwise, used by the
11 students of the Institute?

12 A Yes.

13 Q Now, do you remember how many students there
14 were in that class from the Army?

15 A Yes, I do.

16 Q How many?

17 A Three.

18 Q And, of those, one was a medical officer,
19 wasn't he?

20 A Yes.

21 Q And, one was an intendance officer.

22 A Yes.

23 Q Neither of them, of course, had any connec-
24 tion with operations?
25

THE PRESIDENT: You are talking about the

Research Institute of Total War, Major?

1 THE INTERPRETER: The witness said, "You
2 can't say that they had no connection."

3 MR. BLAKENEY: We were talking about the
4 student body of that Institute, your Honor.

5 THE PRESIDENT: The Research Institute of
6 Total War.

7 Q I don't quite understand your answer that
8 you can't say a medical officer and an intendance
9 officer had no connection with operations. Do you
10 mean that these officers had some special functions
11 which brought them into contact with operational
12 matters?

13 A As a question of principle, the Institute
14 did not study operational matters, but a study of
15 various problems in connection with operations, or
16 as they relate to operations, and medical officers
17 and intendance officers were necessary in making
18 studies of the problems of total warfare.

19 Q General ARISUE, who came as a lecturer to
20 your Institute, came at the request of the Institute,
21 did he?

22 A Yes.

23 Q He was Chief of the Intelligence Section of
24 the General Staff, wasn't he?
25

1 A Yes.

2 Q And, when he came to give you lectures, they
3 were lectures, were they not, on general information
4 on the current war situation?

5 A Yes.

6 Q And, was the same true of Colonel NISHIURA
7 who was Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the
8 Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry?

9 A Colonel NISHIURA did not speak about the
10 military situation but the war, as viewed from the
11 standpoint of military administration.

12 Q When were you captured by the Soviet forces?

13 A August 19, 1945.

14 Q Have you been a prisoner of war since that
15 time?

16 A Well, the Japanese Government says that I
17 am not a prisoner of war, but I am receiving treat-
18 ment as a prisoner of war.

19 Q Have you been tried for the commission of
20 any crime or offense against the U.S.S.R?

21 A No.

22 Q Have you been charged with the commission
23 of any such crime or offense?

24 A No.

25 Q Have you been informed that you are under

1 investigation on suspicion of having committed war
2 crimes against the U.S.S.?

3 A No.

4 Q Do you know of any reason that you, as a
5 prisoner of war, have not been repatriated to Japan?

6 A I know of no reason.

7 MR. BLAKENEY: That concludes my cross-
8 examination, but I believe other counsel desire to
9 cross-examine.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Blewett.

11 MR. BLAKENEY: I keep forgetting. May I
12 make a reference to certain evidence in connection
13 with this cross-examination?

14 The reference I wish to make is to the same
15 pages of the record referred to in connection with
16 the cross-examination of the witness MATSUURA and,
17 in addition, to page 7,575 of the record.

18 MR. BLEWETT: If the Tribunal please, a
19 short cross-examination on behalf of General TOJO.

20 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Blewett.

21 MR. BLEWETT: May the witness be shown
22 exhibit 688-A, the Japanese version?

23 (Whereupon, a document was handed
24 to the witness.)
25

CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

1 BY MR. BLEWETT:

2 Q Do you perceive the word "draft" added to
3 the title of this document?
4

5 A Yes, I notice the characters.
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1 Q Now, do you recognize the writing on this
2 document "only to be used inside the institute"?

3 A Yes, I notice it.

4 Q Do you also perceive the words "outside of
5 the institute to be returned as soon as possible" --
6 or I think the words are "as soon as through"?

7 A Yes, I notice it here.

8 Q Do you know whether or not at any time this
9 document from which you quoted in your last affidavit
10 was presented to the Japanese Government?

11 A Well, this document is dated at a time prior
12 to my tenure of office as director, and so I cannot say
13 that I actually saw or heard that this particular docu-
14 ment was presented to the government; but in the light
15 of custom such drafts as these would be presented to
16 the cabinet and to the various government departments
17 concerned.

18 Q Well, inasmuch as you were not there at the
19 time you cannot tell us whether or not the government
20 took any action upon this particular document?

21 A No, I cannot say anything.

22 Q Can you tell us from your experience as head
23 of this organization whether or not this document was
24 prepared for the use of the students of the institute?
25

A No, this was a result of studies made by the

1 students and later on were used as reference for future
2 studies.

3 THE MONITOR: Japanese court reporter.

4 (Whereupon, the last question was
5 read by the Japanese court reporter.)

6 THE WITNESS: This was a result of studies
7 made by students and were used as reference for future
8 studies and as reference for organs which would carry
9 out the matters contained in the study.

10 THE MONITOR: That is how I think.

11 Q Did the Research Institute of Total War have
12 any responsibility in formulating national policies?

13 A No, the purpose of the Total War Research
14 Institute was only study and education. Whether any
15 studies made by the Institute were adopted by the govern-
16 ment or not was entirely dependent on the government
17 itself; it was at its own discretion.

18 THE PRESIDENT: How did this particular study
19 come to reach the cabinet, as the certificate of source
20 and authenticity shows?

21 THE WITNESS: Such documents as these were not
22 only kept in the files of the Institute but also were
23 circulated to the cabinet and to the government depart-
24 ments concerned, and in the light of such a custom, I
25 believe that this document too was sent to the cabinet

1 and to other agencies of the government concerned for
2 purposes of reference.

3 Q By whom were you appointed to the Research
4 Institute of Total Mobilization and Warfare?

5 A By His Majesty the Emperor.

6 Q Is that the same as the Research Institute
7 of Total War?

8 THE MONITOR: Mr. Blewett, I think it is a
9 language problem.

10 Q I will explain, then. In your affidavit,
11 General, you use the term "Research Institute of Total
12 Mobilization and Warfare." In these proceedings there
13 has been reference to "Research Institute of Total War."
14 I presume the two are identical?

15 A Yes, they are identical, but it is correct to
16 say Soryokusen Kenkyusho, or Institute for Total War
17 Research.

18 Q Could it be that there was a different organi-
19 zation formed subsequent to December 7, 1941?

20 A As far as war guidance or war leadership is
21 concerned, the Total War Research Institute was estab-
22 lished for the purpose of making studies relating to
23 this subject. But as to the various aspects of war, I
24 believe that various other organs were created for the
25 study of the respective special subjects.

1 Q Do you know anything about the status of the
2 Institute during 1940 and the early part of 1941?

3 A What do you mean by status?

4 Q Well, now, did not the Institute known as the
5 Research Institute of Total War practically cease to
6 function before December, 1941?

7 A There was a reorganization in 1943 and the
8 Institute was abolished in 1944, that is, the end of
9 1944.

10 Slight correction: The Institute underwent
11 a reorganization at the end of 1943 and was abolished
12 in 1944.

13 THE MONITOR: The reorganization was carried
14 out toward the end of 1943 and this Institute was
15 abolished in 1944.

16 MR. BLEWETT: Didn't he say something about
17 1941 in that answer?

18 THE WITNESS: No, I spoke nothing about that.

19 Q Now, in looking over the records of the Insti-
20 tute when you got there in 1943, did not you see that
21 there were three periods from the Institute's start in
22 1940 to sometime in 1941 --

23 THE MONITOR: Is it complete, Mr. Blewett?

24 MR. BLEWETT: I will withdraw that and reframe
25 it.

1 Q When you took over your duties in March 1943,
2 from previous records which you indicate you studied,
3 from your affidavit, did not you notice that there were
4 three periods from 1940 through 1941 -- three periods
5 of study?

6 A I don't understand what you mean by three
7 study periods.

8 Q It has been testified here by INOUE that there
9 were three periods -- three different classes I assume
10 he means -- and that after the third period the
11 Institute was abolished.

12 A Yes. Now I understand. Yes, the first period
13 of the Institute ended in 1941, and the second period
14 students ended in 1942, and the third period students
15 ended in 1943, and that was the last class.

16 Q I think you are probably a little confused
17 on that, but I will ask you this question: Was not
18 practically a new organization set up after the war
19 had begun to aid in going forward with that war -- I
20 refer to the Pacific war?

21 A Well that probably was the Supreme Council for
22 the Direction of War that was created in the government
23 during the war.

24 Q Was not this Institute of which you were the
25 head in 1943 and 1944 primarily interested in studies

1 pertaining to the Pacific War?

2 A The clear and thorough understanding of the
3 concept of the Japanese State, that is, the fundamental
4 character of the State, and the resolute prosecution of
5 the war of Greater East Asia.

6 Q Is it not a fact that after the abolition of
7 the Institute all the documents and papers were sent
8 over to the Cabinet Archives?

9 A I have not heard nor seen that fact, but I
10 imagine that would be the case.

11 Q Well after November 1, 1943 were there any
12 students, or were there any persons added to the staff
13 members?

14 A No addition insofar as students were concerned
15 but there was some addition in the staff of the Institute.

16 Q Well now, what was your staff when you assumed
17 control in March 1943? How many staff members did you
18 have? I mean, the number of your faculty or whatever
19 terminology you used.

20 A I don't recall the exact figure, but I think it
21 was around fifteen.

22 Q Now, to what was it reduced on November 1, 1943?

23 A The number fell down to less than ten.

24 Q It was eight, wasn't it?

25 A I don't recall the exact number, but I think

1 that was so -- that it may have been that number.

2 Q And after 1944 no student was admitted and
3 the activities of the Institute ceased, is that correct?

4 A Yes, you are right.

5 MR. BLEWETT: That is all, your Honor, thank you.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Apparently there is no further
7 cross-examination.

8 Colonel Ivanov.

9 RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION

10 BY COLONEL IVANOV.

11 Q I ask that the witness be shown exhibits 690
12 and 688-A.

13 (Whereupon, two documents were
14 handed to the witness.)

15 Q Witness, will you take a glance at these
16 documents and tell us which of these studies were
17 made under the instruction of TOJO?

18 A That General TOJO requested was a study of
19 what I have in my hand, this document; and his request
20 was that a general study be made as to the administration
21 of occupied areas.

22 Q Will you name the number of this exhibit? It
23 appears on the cover of the book.

24 A Well, there are two numbers on this document:
25 1355 and 690.

1 Q This is exhibit 690.

2 THE PRESIDENT: A?

3 Q Tell us, witness, to which document was the
4 counsel for the accused TOJO referring in his cross-
5 examination, which of these documents that you have
6 now before you?

7 A Well, I don't exactly understand the meaning
8 of the question, but I don't think that the counsel for
9 His Excellency TOJO asked me any question in connection
10 with this book, or this document.

11 Q So, did I understand you correctly that you
12 stated here that the counsel for the accused TOJO did
13 not ask you a single question concerning the document
14 which was worked out in accordance with instructions by
15 the accused TOJO?

16 A That is how I think.

17 Q Will you tell us what part was played by the
18 lectures on the spiritual education of the students, and
19 what part was played by the research work which was
20 carried out under your guidance?

21 A Well, there is this question of proportion or
22 ratio between spirit and matter, and the question of the
23 national concept of the Japanese State was undertaken
24 as a spiritual study and from a spiritual angle; but
25 from the point of view of quantity, I should say that
much work was done, that is, there were more studies

1 so far as quantity was concerned.

2 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until half
3 past nine tomorrow morning.

4 (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment
5 was taken until Thursday, 30 October 1947 at
6 0930.)

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